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Abstract 
This study comparatively analyses inequalities in educational outcomes as well as education effects on 
the occupational status of prime-age workers across 21 countries. Considering two distinct aspects of 
educational outcomes—credentials and measured worker skills—the study’s main role is to assess 
their partial effects on occupational placement, contingent on social origin. Overall, parental education 
effects on educational achievement in terms of both credentials and skills are large. Likewise, 
occupational status is strongly associated with educational certificate attained. Labor market 
placement based on worker skills is significant as well, but to a lesser extent. The individual-level path 
dependencies of origin-education and education-destination vary considerably across countries. In 
part, this variation is associated with a country’s skills formation system in terms of vocational 
specialization and the degree of economic coordination as measured by bargaining coordination. In 
line with prior research, vocational specificity relates to increased educational inequality. In addition, 
the study finds that economic coordination mitigates educational inequality as it reduces the 
intergenerational transmission of certificates and skills. In systems in which vocational specificity is 
accompanied by a high degree of coordination, the detrimental inequality effect of vocational 
specificity tends to level off. Moreover, economic coordination facilitates occupational placement 
based on worker skills. A concise discussion of the policy implications concludes this paper. 
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The institutional conditions of inequality in credential and skill attainment and their 
impact on occupational placement 
1 Introduction 
Education plays an important role in mediating social origin and socio-economic outcomes, as 
has been well documented in the extensive literature on status attainment and 
intergenerational social mobility. Strong associations between origin and education on the one 
hand, and between education and occupational destination on the other, have been reported. 
The direct effect of education on occupational placement is much larger than that of social 
origin (e.g. Sewell, Haller & Ohlendorf, 1970). A basic distinction in educational outcomes 
can be made between formal educational attainment levels, i.e. the credentials obtained, and 
the skills actually possessed by individuals or populations. This study analyzes origin-
education (OE) and education-destination (ED) associations across countries by 
differentiating credentials and worker skills. It examines whether measured worker skills, in 
addition to educational certificates, can aid our understanding of social inequalities in 
educational achievement and occupational attainment. In addition to separating educational 
credentials from occupational-relevant skills (measured as adult proficiency in numeracy and 
literacy) the assessment of contextual and moderating effects of country-level variables is a 
key contribution. In this respect, not only effects of educational institutions on the OE and ED 
associations are analyzed, but also the impacts of country variation in economic coordination. 
Previous literature has covered this aspect much less than that of educational institutions. 
As well as information on the highest level of education attained, the Survey of Adult Skills 
(henceforth PIAAC
1
) conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 2013a) provides direct and comparable measures of key cognitive 
skills, and thus makes it possible to comparatively study the associations of both types of 
                                                          
1
 The acronym PIAAC stands for Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies. 
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educational outcomes. Drawing on this data, this study describes how countries vary in the 
two-way associations between (1) social origin and education, and (2) education and 
destination, when education is subdivided into credentials and worker skills. First, 
comparative results on the inequalities in educational outcomes in terms of educational groups 
and measured skills (OE association), as well as their effects on labor market outcomes (ED 
association), are presented for 21 countries. Based on the assumption that country differences 
in educational institutions and in economic coordination influence the formation of 
educational outcomes contingent on social origin as well as the allocation of social position 
and economic rewards, the estimated cross-country differences are then explained by 
countries’ institutional features.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines theoretical perspectives on 
credentials and skills, and describes how these concepts relate to existing research on social 
inequality in education attainment and the effect of education outcomes on occupational 
placement. This is followed by a discussion of the institutional country effects and how they 
are expected to moderate the partial effects of credentials and skills. The data and technical 
details are introduced in section 3, section 4 presents the results, and section 5 summarizes 
and concludes. 
2 Credentials and worker skills in comparative perspective 
2.1 Differences and commonalities between educational credentials and worker skills 
Educational credentials pertain to formal learning, which usually takes place in an 
institutionalized education system. Typically, a credential (i.e. certificate or degree) is 
awarded upon successful completion of a formal education program to certify that a specific 
set of skills associated with the program has been achieved. Education thus makes an 
important contribution to the formation of productive capacities as it transforms cognitive and 
non-cognitive native abilities into skills that are more or less useful in the labor market.  
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In studies of the labor market outcomes of education, it is common for the skill endowments 
of individuals to serve as proxies for formal qualifications attained. Indeed, the rationale 
behind this approach is that credentials and skills are correlated. However, credentials and 
skills are not interchangeable because they relate to different concepts that cover certain 
aspects of educational achievement. Consequently, it has been shown that there is substantial 
skills heterogeneity among individuals who have attained a credential at the same educational 
level, or even the same credential (Green & McIntosh, 2007; Kerckhoff, Raudenbush & 
Glennie, 2001). Independently and net of each other, both skills and credentials are 
determinants of labor market success. Over and above formal education attained, measured 
worker skills are positively related to wages (Van de Werfhorst, 2011). While cognitive skills 
account for a considerable share of the total education effect in terms of earnings, their 
relative importance varies systematically across countries according to the organization of 
their schooling system (Barone & Van de Werfhorst, 2011).  
Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 1, the data used in this study looks at heterogeneous skills as 
well. Within educational groups the dispersion between the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles amounts to 
more than 3 standard deviations, while the interquartile range is larger than 1.2 standard 
deviations in each group.
2
 When comparing the median proficiency scores or certain 
percentiles of the distributions across the four educational categories, a skills hierarchy is 
evident. Individuals who attained higher levels of formal education tend to outperform those 
who attained lower levels. Moreover, a horizontal differentiation of the middling educational 
level between vocational- and general-oriented programs with similar quantities of cumulative 
years of schooling shows the expected result that general programs tend to outperform 
vocational ones. Nevertheless, and this is the point I wish to make here, the distributions of 
adjacent groups largely overlap, and even between the highest and the lowest educational 
group there is substantial overlap. Accordingly, almost 25% of individuals in the lowest group 
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 In literacy, 1 standard deviation amounts to 43 proficiency points in the lowest, and 37 points in the highest, 
educational group. In numeracy, the dispersion is larger and amounts to 47 and 41 points, respectively. 
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who have attained no more than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-2) and up to 50% of 
those with upper secondary education (ISCED 3-4) perform better than 25% of tertiary-
educated individuals. This holds true for both numeracy and literacy proficiency, which show 
very similar distributions.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Direct measures of cognitive skills provided by survey data normally correspond to broadly 
transferable skills that do not represent the full spectrum of knowledge, skills, and 
competences associated with an education certificate. Nor do they reflect the specific, 
technical, skill sets necessary to fully perform the tasks of certain occupations. In addition, the 
skill sets valued in the labor market consist of specific vocational and professional skills along 
with other generic skills such as interaction, communication, learning abilities, and physical 
skills. Different occupational segments demand different skill sets in which the relevance of 
generic skill measures varies. However, cognitive numeracy and literacy skills constitute a 
foundation for the development of specific technical and professional skills and thus 
determine job performance (see Abrassart, 2013). Pedagogical research on vocational 
education suggests that generic skills are highly correlated with the development of domain-
specific practical skills, and that the former serve as a proxy for prospective, professional skill 
development.
3
 Moreover, literacy and numeracy are, together with work ethic, considered 
important employability skills (see Rosenberg et al., 2012). Liu and Grusky (2013) report that 
US labor markets increasingly reward cognitive analytical skills, for whose development the 
skill measures provided by PIAAC are essential, while they find that technical and creative 
skills are valued less. 
The concepts of numeracy and literacy skills are implemented in PIAAC as “‘key 
information-processing skills’ that are relevant to adults in many social contexts and work 
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 Examples from Germany and Switzerland, e.g. for the vocational domains business and engineering, can be 
found in Winther and Prenzel (2014). 
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situations, and necessary for fully integrating and participating in the labour market” (OECD, 
2016a, p. 20). They are generic, analytical, problem-solving skills that are demanded by the 
labor market because they are needed to respond appropriately to a variety of workplace tasks 
and work contexts (OECD, 2013c). For example, numeracy is defined “as the ability to 
access, use, interpret and communicate mathematical information and ideas,” with the aim of 
“managing a situation or solving a problem in a real context, by responding to mathematical 
content/information/ideas represented in multiple ways.” (OECD, 2016b, p. 18).  
Given that credentials and skills refer to different concepts of educational achievement that 
vary empirically, it is of interest—within the limitations of skill and qualification measures 
provided by observational data—to assess their net effects on occupational placement across 
countries and to analyze whether there are differential social origin effects on the formation of 
these two types of educational achievement. Rather than substitute for indirect measures of 
human capital like formal qualifications, it is held that direct skill measures complement 
them. Combining both concepts can offer greater insight into the processes of skills 
acquisition and their occupational outcomes, at both individual and country level. 
2.2 The formation of credentials and skills and their occupational outcomes 
Formal education has become an important institution that mediates family background and 
occupational outcomes. In line with the lesson learned from status attainment research 
building on the seminal work of Blau and Duncan (1967), it is fair to assume that on average 
across countries the direct family effect on offsprings’ occupational status is small compared 
with the indirect family effect mediated by educational achievement variables. Substantial 
parental education effects on credential and skill achievement should therefore correspond to 
considerable effects of credentials and skills on occupational status attainment.  
7 
 
2.2.1 OE linkage 
The abundant sociological research on educational stratification has elaborated in great detail 
on inequality of educational attainment associated with socio-economic background 
characteristics in comparative perspective (e.g. Breen & Jonsson, 2005; Breen, Luijkx, Müller 
& Pollak, 2009; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). Social origin, most often measured by parental 
education or occupational status, can affect educational attainment through various channels. 
Education systems value certain types of cognitive abilities, attitudes, and values that are 
prevalent and reinforced predominantly among the higher social classes and higher educated 
backgrounds. Parents’ interest in their children’s development is likely to motivate and create 
a supportive environment in order to facilitate academic success. In addition to the social and 
cultural advantages of doing this, higher levels of economic resources allow members of 
wealthier households to take riskier educational choices and go onto higher levels of 
education, even in cases where performance at school is no better than that of working class 
students who decide not to transit to the next educational level and instead leave formal 
education.  
There is no reason to expect that social reproduction in educational outcomes differs 
systematically between credentials and skills. Both outcomes may benefit from advantageous 
backgrounds in similar ways. Indeed, family effects on educational outcomes are well-
established in terms of both credentials and skills; in the case of social inequality in skill 
attainment in schools, this has been highlighted by the large-scale, international assessments 
of student performance conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of 
Educational Achievement (IEA) and the OECD (e.g. PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS). However, the 
analytical reports produced from this data show marked country variation in student 
performance differences related to socio-economic background (e.g. OECD, 2013d), 
suggesting that national education systems influence educational inequalities considerably. 
Consequently, school systems differ widely in the extent to which they succeed in providing 
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beneficial opportunities for all against the backdrop of diverse student populations, and 
mitigating unequal background characteristics.  
2.2.2 ED linkage 
Sociological and economic accounts of the ED association draw on various theoretical 
approaches that differ with respect to the micro-level explanations they offer for the observed 
education-job link (see Bills, 2003). Human capital theory (HCT) (Becker, 1964) posits that 
the skills accumulated in education and on the job make a significant difference to workers’ 
labor market outcomes. Schooling is understood as a mechanism of merit-based selection, 
given free educational and occupational choice. The basic mechanism underlying the ED link 
is that individuals’ productive capacities, which are determined by the skills learned during 
periods of education and training, are rewarded by the labor market accordingly. For the rest, 
neoclassical assumptions apply, i.e. within perfectly competitive markets, fully-informed and 
rational individuals maximize utility and employers’ profits. 
In the process of matching workers to jobs, however, firms do not know the true productive 
capacities of job seekers. Instead, they screen job applicants for signals that allow them to 
assess their potential productivity. Important signals on which both sides of the market rely in 
the hiring process are educational certificates. As employers screen the labor market, job 
seekers acquire education to signal that they are able to meet the skill demanded by 
employers. However, contrary to HCT, signaling and screening theorists (Arrow, 1973; 
Spence, 1973) do not believe that education per se enhances productivity. Rather, the skills 
required to perform job tasks well are acquired through on-the-job-training after entering the 
labor market. To save on training costs, employers prefer to hire those with high levels of 
education as this is expected to correlate positively with unobserved characteristics that will 
facilitate efficient on-the-job-training, like ability, work ethic, motivation, and readiness to 
learn. In line with HCT assumptions, abler individuals acquire higher levels of education 
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because the costs and the risks associated with the educational investment are lower for them 
than for less able individuals.  
The credentialist view (Collins, 1979), on the other hand, breaks with this conceptualization 
and holds that it is not the superior skills of the better educated but their ability to exclusively 
access higher job ranks, thus benefitting from a mechanism of social closure. Although 
schooling and productivity are not independent in this view, the returns to educational 
credentials are higher than the gains in productivity associated with their attainment. This 
reasoning fits well with the above-mentioned observation that workers holding the same 
credential differ with respect to their skills and productive capacities, as do workers who 
occupy the same job, a situation that has been termed “heterogeneous skills” (Green & 
McIntosh, 2007). Credentialist theory allows for a conceptualization of the impact of 
institutional structures on job assignment that goes beyond technological or organizational 
factors in the workplace to those of the education system itself and to the system of industrial 
relations. 
So, what can be understood from the micro-level approaches to the two different concepts of 
education put forward in this study? In competing for jobs, job seekers may want to invest 
more in education in order to signal high potential productivity. If this leads to a situation in 
which less able individuals attain the same educational levels as more able individuals, this 
could be one reason for the observed skills heterogeneity within educational groups. As more 
and more individuals attain higher levels of education, credentials may forfeit their signaling 
capacity, and thus direct measures of skills may play an increasing role in labor market 
transactions (through checks, assessments, personal interviews, and the like). It is, however, 
possible that the most productive workers are at the same time more successful in accessing 
higher status jobs, potentially because they can benefit from their skills in the hiring process, 
e.g. due to better information. In such situations, the explanations put forward by either theory 
are not unconnected as they are more or less relevant for both types of educational 
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achievement.
4
 The relative effects of credentials and skills on occupational placement can be 
differentiated with regard to their timing as well. Workers have earned their educational 
credentials, which are very important in the labor market entrance phase, years or even 
decades ago, whereas surveys that assess worker skills at the same time as occupational 
information is collected reflect the “skills for which the labor market is currently rewarding 
workers” (Kerckhoff et al., 2001, p. 3).  
Previous attempts to evaluate the explanatory power of skills compared with educational 
attainment in labor market outcomes have been made for single countries, predominantly the 
United States (see Kerckhoff, et al., 2001). While the basic finding of earlier studies was that 
worker skills do not contribute much to the explanation of labor market outcomes once 
credentials are controlled for, Kerckhoff et al. found differential effects across ethnic groups. 
The few comparative studies available so far suggest that relative effects vary across countries 
(Barone & Van de Werfhorst, 2011; Bol & Weeden, 2015; Van de Werfhorst, 2011). These 
studies point to an association between the relative value of educational certificates and 
worker skills, and the degree of credentialization in occupational placement (see section 2.3 
below). 
To sum up, the following hypotheses are tested against the data with regard to the micro-level 
mechanisms of OE and ED linkages: 
H1: Parental education effects on credentials correlate positively with their effects on worker 
skills across countries, as social reproduction is similar for both educational dimensions.  
H2: In contrast, the relative effects of credentials and skills on occupational placement are 
negatively associated across countries, because if the partial effect of worker skills on 
occupational placement is high, the partial effect of certificates is expected to be low and vice 
versa.  
                                                          
4
 I thank an anonymous reviewer who made me aware of this situation. 
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2.3 The institutional context 
The institutional literature on education and skill formation systems focuses on the 
dimensions of stratification and vocational specificity (Allmendinger, 1989; Bol & Van de 
Werfhorst, 2013; Breen, 2005; Kerckhoff, 1995; Wolbers, 2003). Differences in these 
variables at the system level were found to have distinct implications for the status and quality 
of occupations attained, including promotion patterns, further training opportunities, and 
wages. Stratified systems track students at relatively early stages into distinct educational 
paths, providing them with various vocational specializations largely within initial education. 
Educational tracking in combination with vocational education and training has been found to 
strengthen the impact of family background on educational achievement (e.g. Pfeffer, 2008) 
and subsequent occupational outcomes, which leads to less educational mobility (for a review 
see Bartlett, 2009).  
With respect to differences in student performance, Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) found 
that comprehensive school systems reduce inequality in educational outcomes while stratified 
systems increase it. Likewise, OECD (2013b) shows a negative correlation between 
horizontal educational stratification and equity in education, meaning that students’ socio-
economic origin has a stronger effect on their performance in systems that track students at 
early ages into different educational pathways and in which vocational programs are prevalent 
at the upper secondary level, compared with comprehensive and less vocational-specific 
systems. Across OECD countries, early selection, the number of different tracks, and the 
prevalence of vocational programs are strongly correlated. However, according to Brunello 
and Checchi (2007), there are two counteracting effects of vocational education on the impact 
of parental background: while the “diversion effect” keeps lower-class students away from 
higher education, the “specialization effect” on the other hand countervails the parental effect 
because vocational education enhances the labor market prospects of the disadvantaged, eases 
the transition from school to work, and promotes further training and the development of adult 
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skills beyond initial schooling. It remains unclear though, whether the two effects balance 
each other out or whether one dominates the other.  
According to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach’s influential argument of 
institutional complementarity, skill formation systems have evolved in correspondence with 
production regimes, labor market institutions, and industrial relations systems (Hall & 
Gingerich, 2009; Hall & Soskice, 2001). In particular, the prevalent mode of economic 
coordination and the level of social protection are closely related to the vocational specificity 
of secondary schooling systems (Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice, 2001). In the presence of 
generous social protection and coordination the risks of investing in vocation-specific skills 
are reduced since employment protection is high, wage bargaining beyond the firm level 
ensures that skills are rewarded and, where there is unemployment, benefits mitigate income 
losses. Following on from Busemeyer and Jensen (2012), who argue that economic 
coordination matters most in explaining educational investments and returns of workers while 
social protection pertains to the socio-economic situation of the unemployed, this study 
focuses on countries’ levels of economic coordination. Bargaining coordination is seen as a 
key variable in the VoC literature because it indicates the degree to which employer behavior 
is influenced by non-market factors such as deliberative institutions and collective actors at 
various levels. Moreover, collective wage bargaining is assumed to influence the impact of 
vocational specificity on inequality.  
Busemeyer and Iversen (2012) found that less labor market stratification occurs only in 
systems in which vocational specificity is complemented by high levels of coordination. In 
liberal market economies where bargaining coordination is low, employers rely primarily on 
competitive market mechanisms to coordinate industrial relations and exchanges with other 
economic spheres. In such less regulated systems, wage bargaining mainly takes place at the 
company level. In highly regulated, coordinated market economies, on the other hand, 
collective wage bargaining takes place at the industry-level or may even encompass the whole 
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economy. In these economies, the argument goes, it is efficient for employers to contribute to 
long-term investment strategies in high-quality production, including skill investments that 
aim to develop a highly skilled and specialized workforce with transferable vocational skills. 
Likewise, workers have incentives to invest in vocational-specific skills because their 
investment is likely to be rewarded by any firm in the industry or sector. As a result, skill 
endowments of workers without academic credentials are expected to be higher in 
coordinated economies than in systems with low levels of coordination. It is thus assumed that 
inequality in skill achievement among all workers decrease with the degree of coordination.
5
 
Inequality in the attainment of educational credentials is expected to decrease with 
coordination as well, because liberal systems with rather fragmented market coordination 
have developed relatively large higher education sectors. This leads to particularly high 
proportions of tertiary-educated individuals, while leaving those outside higher education with 
rather low levels of secondary education.  
Educational credentials are relevant labor market entry signals. But especially in coordinated 
and highly regulated labor markets they will continue to be critical determinants of 
occupational status throughout an individual’s working life, as in such credentialized systems, 
educational certificates are door-openers to legally regulated professions (Di Stasio et al., 
2016). In less regulated systems, in which labor market transactions are guided by the market 
mechanism to a greater extent, the human capital explanation should be of higher relevance in 
explaining occupational outcomes. As employers become more and more aware of the true 
productive capacities their employees possess, they may use this information—within the 
constraints imposed on their economic activities—in their decisions about layoffs, 
promotions, and related training opportunities. Regulated labor markets, on the other hand, 
                                                          
5
 The VoC approach refers to different vocational-specific skills than the skill measures used in this study. 
However, as mentioned before, the two are closely related since generic skills are foundations for technical 
skills. 
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constrain employers’ decisions to a greater extent and allow them less discretion to adapt to 
productivity changes or the availability of better matches (Sørensen, 1983). 
Previous attempts have been made to relate the observed country variation in the relative 
labor market value of credentials and skills to institutional characteristics. In his analysis of 
the effects of the institutional characteristics of schooling systems in 18 countries, Van de 
Werfhorst (2011) found significant differences across countries and the credential explanation 
more relevant in strongly vocational-oriented schooling systems, while skills added little to 
the explanation of the education-job link in terms of earnings in these systems. The argument 
is that credentials in occupation-specific education systems convey more reliable information 
on the skills associated with their attainment, and thus employers have better signals about 
candidates’ typical productive capacities than they would from more comprehensive systems 
that are less vocationally specific. Likewise, Barone and Van de Werfhorst (2011) found 
country variation in labor market returns to different forms of cognitive skills which could be 
explained by differences in the education systems and labor market regulations, in particular 
with regard to the level of credentialization in access to occupations. As professionalization 
and occupational regulation are prevalent in countries with a high level of economic 
coordination and vocational specificity, access to a wide range of occupations legally requires 
certain credentials or licenses. Thus the credentialist view is expected to be more relevant in 
strongly regulated education and occupational systems in which entitlements are connected to 
educational credentials obtained through formal education, than in less regulated systems in 
which the human capital explanation should be of higher relevance.
6
 To sum up, the following 
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 Of course, credentialization is not a characteristic exclusively displayed by coordinated market economies, as it 
is to some extent present in liberal market economies as well. In fact much of the work on further elaborating 
closure as a social phenomenon was done in the United States. For example, Weeden and Grusky (2014) recently 
showed that by restricting the supply of credentials and licenses, closure creates occupational and educational 
rents that account for the extreme income inequality in the higher levels of the U.S. income distribution. Even in 
liberal systems, real markets, and in particular labor markets, are never perfectly competitive. The concept of 
open and closed social relationships and its association with credentialization was originally developed by 
Weber (1980) when he described the rise of the “Bildungspatente” required to enter public service within the 
German bureaucracy (pp. 551-580). 
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hypotheses regarding the institutional determinants of individual-level relationships will be 
tested: 
H3: In countries where education systems sort students into different educational programs 
later, inequality in credential and skill attainment is lower.  
H4a: Vocational-specific education systems are associated with higher inequalities in 
credential and skill attainment.  
H4b: In vocational-specific systems labor market credentialization is expected to be more 
relevant in explaining the education-job linkage, i.e. credentials are more relevant than worker 
skills for occupational status attainment. 
H5a: Higher levels of economic coordination are associated with lower levels of educational 
inequality across countries.  
H5b: Economic coordination is associated with higher levels of labor market 
credentialization. 
3 Data and variables 
The sample consisted of prime-age workers (30- to 49-year olds) in 21 countries who took 
part in the first round of the PIAAC survey conducted in 2011/12. In each country, at least 
5,000 individuals aged 16 to 65 were interviewed and underwent a skills assessment. The 
survey is designed to provide cross-culturally and cross-nationally valid data on education, 
individual skills, and occupation, together with a wide range of background information 
including parental education and social origin. The data thus offers the opportunity of 
analyzing skill-formation systems and their outcomes from a comparative perspective. The 
countries included were: Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, (the Republic of) Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
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(England and Northern Ireland only), and the United States. Workers below the age of 30 
were excluded from the analysis to ensure that most people had completed their initial 
education. The upper age limit of 49 was set to avoid potential bias from country variations in 
pension systems and early retirement. Country-level data was obtained from several sources 
(see below).  
3.1 Individual-level variables 
The occupational status variable was categorized according to International Socio-economic 
Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) scores (Ganzeboom et al., 2010), which were assigned to 
participants’ current occupation or, in case of the unemployed, the last job they had held in 
the five years prior to the survey. PIAAC provides job information according to the 2008 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) at the 2-digit level (sub-major 
groups). For Canada, Estonia, and Finland, only information for the major groups at the 1-
digit level was available.  
Educational outcomes were separated into educational credentials and worker skills. 
Credentials were rated in terms of the highest level of formal education completed. PIAAC 
provides this information according to the International Standard Classification of Education 
1997 (ISCED 97). The classification used here aggregates the data into three main vertical 
levels (low, medium, and high) and one horizontal dimension that differentiates the medium 
level into general- and vocational-oriented programs, resulting in four categories: (1) lower 
secondary education or less (ISCED02, including ISCED 3C short), (2) upper secondary or 
post-secondary education with vocational orientation (ISCED34V), (3) upper secondary or 
post-secondary education with general orientation (ISCED34G), and (4) tertiary education 
(ISCED5A6, degree level). The focus when analyzing country variation in educational 
stratification was on the latter category, which was also termed the higher education (HE) 
credential. Further differentiation at this degree level was not feasible because only very few 
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doctoral degrees were observed (fewer than ten in half of the countries) and observations of 
bachelor degrees were very low in some countries where the Bologna degree structure had 
been implemented recently (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic).
7
  
Worker skills in numeracy and literacy were measured using a cognitive assessment. Survey 
respondents were asked to complete tasks of varying difficulty with regard to (1) the content 
of the tasks (i.e. artefacts, tools, knowledge, representations, and cognitive challenges), (2) the 
processes (i.e. the cognitive strategies required to respond to or use the content appropriately), 
and (3) the context in which the tasks occurred (e.g. work-related, personal, society and 
community, or education and training). Numeracy tasks included the calculation of change, 
use of spreadsheets, application of formulae, handling of money and budgets, or the 
interpretation of quantitative information and statistical messages. The resulting skill was 
rated on a continuum of proficiency, with scores below 226 points belonging to the lowest 
skill level 1, and scores equal to or higher than 376 points belonging to the highest skill level 
5. Individuals at the intermediary numeracy level 3 (276 to less than 326 points) were able to 
apply number sense and spatial sense, recognize and work with mathematical relationships, 
patterns, and proportions expressed in verbal or numerical form, and interpret data and 
statistics in texts, tables and graphs (see OECD, 2016b).  
By design the resulting skill proficiency scores are comparable across countries, the actions 
taken to develop cognitive tasks free of cultural and national bias being state-of-the-art in 
large-scale assessment methodology. Each respondent was given ten plausible values (PVs) 
                                                          
7
 Harmonizing country-specific education variables into cross-national measures like the ISECD is a complex 
task and it has been shown that inconsistent implementation practices across countries may limit comparability 
(see Schneider, 2010). Despite the best efforts of the OECD and national survey agencies to obtain comparable 
education measures, one cannot rule out measurement issues. This has to be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results. Moreover, a more detailed educational categorization than the one employed here would have been 
preferable. This was not feasible, however, because sample size constraints combined with cross-national 
differences concerning which specific ISCED categories to apply would have resulted in empty cells in the 
country-education table. However, at the medium level, a horizontal differentiation of distinct national programs 
which have been collapsed into one ISCED category was feasible. Information on program orientation is 
provided by a separate variable that draws on the original national education categories and expert information, 
as reported by national PIAAC coordinators.  
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assigned to each domain (numeracy and literacy). The PVs were imputed from a posteriori 
distribution using a latent regression model that scaled the results of the cognitive assessment, 
and supplemented by demographic characteristics from the background questionnaire (OECD, 
2013c). In this study, the imputation variance is accounted for by the estimation procedure 
used (see Appendix B). The skill measures were a compound of cognitive ability and a 
multitude of learning outcomes over the life course, reflecting not only formal education 
achievements but also informal learning in the workplace and in everyday life. The credential 
measure may also have captured education-related merits and non-cognitive or professional 
skills that are not represented by numeracy or literacy proficiency. This should be borne in 
mind when interpreting the results. Another problem that limits the interpretation of the skill 
effects on occupational attainment is that of reverse causality, because worker skills and 
occupational information refer to the same point in time. Consequently, causation between the 
two variables cannot be established and thus associations will be reported and discussed.  
Parental education was rated according to three categories using the ISCED 97 classification: 
(1) neither parent has upper secondary education, (2) at least one parent has upper secondary 
education, and (3) at least one parent has obtained a tertiary degree.
8
 The following 
individual-level controls were used: age, dummy variables for female, foreign-born parents 
(indicating if both parents were born in a foreign country), and employment status (indicating 
if respondents were unemployed at the time of the survey). The sample was restricted to 
subjects who were in dependent employment at the time of the survey or who were 
unemployed but had been employed in the five years before the survey. Occupation 
information was therefore available for either the current or last period of employment. 
Furthermore, only individuals who had earned their educational credential in the country of 
their current residence were selected, since only those credentials could be related to domestic 
                                                          
8
 Reducing social origin to parental education was inevitable because no information on parental occupation was 
available. This is certainly a limitation, since only one aspect of the multi-dimensional nature of social origin can 
be analyzed.  
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education institutions. This applied to 33,460 subjects, of whom 31,667 cases had complete 
data. However, since not all variables were included in all models, the sample size changes 
accordingly (see sample statistics in Table A1 in Appendix A). The data has been weighted by 
sampling weights to account for selection probabilities. 
3.2 Country-level variables 
The following country-level variables were analyzed with respect to their direct effects on 
individual-level outcomes (credentials, skills, and occupational status) and their moderating 
effects on individual-level path coefficients: 
1. Differentiation in education systems, as measured by age at which students were selected 
into different educational programs for the first time (age of first selection). 
2. Vocational specificity, as measured by the proportion of students in upper secondary 
education who were in vocational tracks with combined school- and workplace-based 
learning (i.e. within a dual system). This indicates the extent to which the education system 
provides strong signals about the professional skill endowments of certificate holders. This 
measure is preferred over the proportion of upper secondary students in vocational tracks 
(including those in full-time vocational schools) because it reflects the extent to which 
close links between education and the world of work exist (Breen, 2005). Both education 
system indicators were calculated from their average 2007 to 2012, as reported in 
respective volumes of Education at a Glance by the OECD (2009-2014).  
3. Bargaining coordination data,9 drawn from the ICTWSS (Institutional Characteristics of 
Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts) database in 34 countries 
                                                          
9
 The scale distinguishes five levels of coordination: 5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable 
agreements between the central organizations of unions and employers affecting the economy or entire private 
sector, or b) government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze or ceiling; 4 = mixed industry and economy-wide 
bargaining, where a) central organizations negotiate non-enforceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) 
key union and employers’ associations set the pattern for the entire economy; 3 = industry bargaining with no or 
irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of central organizations and limited freedoms for company 
bargaining; 2 = mixed industry- and firm-level bargaining, with weak enforceability of industry agreements; 1 = 
none of the above, only fragmented bargaining mostly at company level. 
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between 1960 and 2012 (see Visser, 2013). The data refers to the average for the years 
1997 to 2006. 
4. Overall level of investment in education (as measured by expenditure on education as a 
percentage of GDP, OECD) was mainly used to control for differences in the degree of 
importance countries attached to education, which also reflects country variation in 
demand for credentials and skills. Country variation in supply was controlled for by 
including mean values for the individual-level explanatory variables of parental education, 
credential, numeracy, and literacy. These variables controlled for country differences in 
relative skill investments as well as average educational endowments of prime-age workers 
and their parents. 
To relate recent institutional characteristics to skill formation and the labor market processes 
of 30- to 49-year olds may constrain interpretation of the findings. However, historical 
developments in education and industrial relations systems are path-dependent and thus stable 
over time. Accordingly, the economic coordination measure used here shows high stability 
since the early 1990s and only some variation before that. Likewise, the vocational specificity 
measure has been very stable since the mid-1990s when the OECD first published 
comparative data on participation in combined school- and workplace-based education 
(Education at a Glance, 1998, reference year 1996), and there has been only one change in the 
age of first selection since 2003 (OECD, 2005).
10
 
4 Results 
The hypotheses were tested by fitting various models to the data. Separate country models 
were used to analyze the micro-level mechanisms of credentials and worker skills formation 
and their effects on occupational placement. Contextual and moderating effects of the 
country-level institutional variables were then analyzed by two-level random coefficient 
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 Poland is misclassified in the first publication 
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models. Alternative model specifications were applied to the data and to subsets of the data to 
assess the robustness of the results. 
4.1 Comparative results of micro-level OE and ED linkages 
The results of the separate country models confirm Hypothesis 1. In all countries the 
attainment of both higher education credentials and worker skills is strongly influenced by 
parental education. As expected, substantial country variation in social origin effects exists. 
The left panel of Figure 2 reveals a specific pattern, in the sense that if the parental effect on 
the credential is low or high its effect on the skill measure tends to be low or high as well. 
This positive relationship is expressed by a strong correlation between country parental 
effects on the two education outcomes (Pearson r=0.78). In general, relatively low parental 
effects on both dimensions are observed in the Nordic countries Finland, Sweden, Denmark, 
and Norway. This is in line with the conventional wisdom that education systems in these 
countries provide educational opportunities relatively independent of social origin. The 
former soviet central European countries the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, and Poland, 
now part of the Visegrád group, cluster on the other end of the distribution along with the 
United States, Germany, and Italy. In these countries, parental education affects both 
educational achievement variables more than in most other countries in the sample.  
Although the correlation is strong and the graph shows good linear approximation, some 
notable peculiarities can be observed. There is a group of countries with similar middling 
parental effects on credential attainment that differ with respect to numeracy skill 
transmission. Among them are the liberal countries United Kingdom (England and Northern 
Ireland) and the Republic of Ireland with above average numeracy skill transmission, and 
Canada, which seems to have higher levels of social mobility in this regard. These three 
liberal systems differ from the US, with its high parental effects, on both educational 
outcomes. Another remarkable case is Germany, which differs greatly from the other 
22 
 
continental European coordinated market economies of the Netherlands, Austria, and 
Belgium. The latter cases display similar low levels of skill transmission (like Finland and 
Denmark), although the attainment of a HE degree depends more on social origin in BE than 
in NL, with AT in the middle. Korea and Japan are located, together with Spain, in the lower 
left quadrant of relatively high social mobility in educational attainment, while France and 
Estonia are close to the average on both dimensions. As with the Nordic countries, social 
inequalities in skill achievement are also relatively low in the far-east countries Korea and 
Japan. Although credentials tend to be awarded contingent on social origin in Japan, its 
education system seems to do well in equipping workers, including those from low-educated 
backgrounds, with high skill levels. The weak influence of students’ socio-economic 
background on learning outcomes in Japan is explained by the fact that financial and 
personnel resources are distributed equitably among schools and students (OECD, 2012). 
Disadvantaged students not only have equal access to qualified teachers, i.e. no difference in 
teacher quality is observed for advantaged students as is the case in other countries, but also 
enjoy extra support and financial subsidies. The same applies to the Korean education system, 
in which both the quantity and quality of human resources are distributed equitably (OECD, 
2014).  
(Figure 2 about here) 
In the right panel of Figure 2, the effects of HE credentials on occupational status attainment 
are plotted against the numeracy effects estimated for each country separately. Across the 21 
countries the two effects are negatively correlated (r=-0.55), which means that in countries 
where the average partial credential effect on labor outcome is high, the partial numeracy 
effect (and literacy as well, see Table A3) tends to be low, and vice versa. This is in line with 
hypothesis 2, which summarizes the theoretical assumption that in some countries the 
credential explanation of the education-job link is more relevant than in others, where the 
human capital explanation of productive skills seems to be of higher relevance in occupational 
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placement. Net of each other, both educational outcome variables are significant determinants 
of status attainment. Despite country variation in the coefficients and their negative 
relationship, the HE credential effect exceeds the standardized skill effect in all countries in 
the sample.
11
  
While this suggests that on average across the 21 systems labor markets are substantially 
characterized by credentialization of the education-job link, the human capital mechanism of 
merit-based allocation of social status is also present. Net of the credential attained, skills 
have relatively large effects on labor market outcome in the liberal economies of the United 
Kingdom (standardized coefficient 0.28), Republic of Ireland (0.24), Canada (0.21), and the 
US (0.20). In Austria (0.26) and the Nordic countries Norway (0.27) and Sweden (0.23), skills 
seem to be as relevant to occupational status attainment as they are in the liberal countries. 
Overall, country variation in the skill effect is rather small. However, the merit-based 
explanation seems to have the lowest relevance in the three Visegrád states in our sample and 
Italy, where the standardized skill effect ranges from 0.07 (Slovak Republic) to 0.12 (Czech 
Republic), followed by Spain (0.13), Japan (0.14), Finland (0.15), and Korea (0.16). While in 
the liberal systems of Canada and the United Kingdom the credential effect is—in line with 
theoretical assumptions—relatively low, the United States and Ireland have average levels of 
credentialization with respect to HE degrees. Labor markets seem to be most credentialized in 
the Slovak Republic, Germany, and Italy, followed by the other two Visegrád countries 
Poland and the Czech Republic. Above-average labor market credentialization is observed in 
Finland and Austria as well. In Germany and Austria where credentialization is high, 
presumably due to their professional occupation systems, skills are estimated to have above-
average effects on occupational placement as well. Japan and Korea, on the other hand, have 
relatively low educational effects on both dimensions, suggesting that the association between 
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 The skill variables have been standardized by dividing by 2 standard deviations to facilitate direct comparison 
with untransformed binary predictors, in this case the HE credential (see Gelman, 2008). 
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occupational status and education in terms of educational credentials and skills is weaker 
there than in other countries. 
4.2 Moderating contextual effects of countries’ institutional characteristics 
To assess the extent to which the institutional country-level variables moderate the path 
dependencies of the OE and ED linkages (hypotheses H3 to H5), the individual-level 
coefficients are allowed to vary across countries and regress on the country-level predictors 
within a two-level modelling framework. These cross-level interactions are separately 
estimated by six random slopes models which can be formally written as: 
, for i = 1,…, n and k = 1,…, K random slopes, 
where  is the random intercept,  is the random slope parameter of slope , and  is 
the standard deviation estimated from the data. The dependent variable  is either the HE 
credential (random slope k = 1), numeracy (k = 2), literacy (k = 3), or the occupational 
outcome (k = 4-6). In the country-level model, the random intercepts and random slopes are 
assigned a probability distribution with variation in the random coefficients with means, 
standard deviations, and a between-group correlation parameter  estimated from the data  
, for j = 1,…, J countries, 
where  is the vector of the country-level predictors,  the associated vector of direct effects 
(on the random intercepts), and  the vector of moderating effects of these predictors.
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Table 1 shows the results of the moderating effects analysis.  
                                                          
12
 An alternative modelling approach is to regress the country-level estimates presented in section 4.1 on the 
country-level predictors. However, I prefer two-level random coefficient models for two reasons: first, separate 
country analysis may overstate the variability in the individual-level estimates across countries, e.g. because of 
differences in the sample sizes of the countries and unequal variation within and between countries; and second, 
multilevel modelling incorporates unequal uncertainty of country-level effects by breaking down the observed 
co-variance into a within- and between-country part. Moreover, the specification of random slopes allows for 
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Hypothesis 3 that expects increased educational inequality in systems which require 
educational decisions at younger ages does not hold in the specification used here. As can be 
seen in Table 1, country variation in the parental education effects on both HE credential and 
worker skill attainment seem to be independent of the age of first selection. This result is at 
odds with part of the literature, although the evidence available is mixed (Breen and Jonsson, 
2005). A potential explanation may be that in comprehensive school systems various forms of 
streaming within schools or classes (e.g. ability grouping) act as a functional equivalent to 
external tracking between different institutions and school types. Also, while tracking may 
increase inequality in skill attainment during initial education, this effect may diminish later 
in working life, potentially due to the specialization effect of vocational education, which, 
according to Brunello and Checchi (2007), may be generated by the curricula in vocational 
schools that seem to bolster further training and adult skills and thereby mitigate the impact of 
social origin. This corresponds to the finding that differentiated systems with substantial 
vocational sectors are conducive to adult numeracy attainment (OECD, 2013a). As regards 
the relationship between occupational status and either of the two educational outcome 
variables, educational stratification in terms of early tracking does not seem to make a 
difference in the education-job link either. While it is known that more comprehensive 
education systems relate to a higher proportion of HE credentials among the workforce, the 
analysis suggests that this does not moderate OE and ED linkages across the 21 countries. 
Hypothesis 4a regarding vocational specificity is supported by the analysis in large part. 
Results are in line with existing evidence that finds vocational education reinforcing family 
background effects on education attainment (Bartlett, 2009; Hanushek & Wößmann, 2006). 
Vocational-specific systems are associated with higher educational inequalities in skill and 
credential attainment. Although in the main specification the moderating effect on HE 
credential attainment is significant at the 10% level only, the effect proves significant at the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
estimating inter-individual variation in response to a country’s social gradient (see Cleasby, Nakagawa & 
Schielzeth, 2015).  
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1% level when the variable on system stratification is omitted. Because there is a relatively 
strong negative correlation between the age of first selection and vocational specificity, all 
models are run for either of the two variables without the other (see section 4.3 and Table S2 
in the online supplement).  
Turning to occupational status attainment (models K4-K6 in Table 1), vocational specificity is 
positively associated with country variation in the labor market effects of both education 
dimensions. This finding is consistent with the theoretical expectation (hypothesis 4b) that 
credentialization is of particular relevance in vocational-specific education systems in which 
occupational entitlements are related to the credentials obtained from upper secondary 
education, through either apprenticeship training or other forms of VET programs that include 
workplace training. However, as measured worker skills tend to be of higher importance for 
job placement in vocational-specific systems as well, both dimensions of education are more 
relevant in explaining occupational attainment in such systems. On one hand, the diversion 
effect of vocational education contributes to labor market credentialization; at the same time, 
the specialization effect tends to some extent to mitigate credentialization and educational 
inequality in the sense that in vocational-specific systems numeracy and literacy skills are 
rewarded more in the labor market compared with less specific systems. Like Van de 
Werfhorst (2011), this study finds no clear relationship between education system 
differentiation and skill effects on labor market outcomes. However, while Van de Werfhorst 
finds that the skill effect on earnings is lower in vocational specific systems, the results 
presented here suggest that vocational specificity is associated with stronger skill effects on 
occupational placement across countries.  
(Table 1 about here) 
The analysis supports hypothesis 5a. Across the 21 countries analyzed, economic coordination 
in terms of bargaining is strongly associated with lower levels of social inequality in 
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educational attainment as measured by credentials and skills. This rather novel finding 
advances the view that the involvement of various actors at different levels contributes to 
equal educational opportunities in both credential and skill attainment. The negative residual 
correlation of the skill formation models (K2 and K3) suggests that countries with high levels 
of numeracy and literacy skills have lower social inequality in skill achievement than do 
countries with lower average skill levels. As a result, greater equity in skill achievement 
translates into the higher skill endowment of the workforce, which points to a desirable win-
win situation. 
Hypothesis 5b must be rejected. Contrary to the expectation of a higher degree of labor 
market credentialization in highly coordinated economies, bargaining coordination is 
associated with higher skill effects on occupational status, while no moderating role on the 
credential effect is observed. As a result, bargaining coordination tends to increase a merit-
based allocation to social positions in the labor market. Hence in coordinated market 
economies skills are not only more equitably distributed among the workforce than in less 
regulated systems, but these skills seem to be more beneficial for job placement as well. The 
finding that economic coordination is functional both in terms of social cohesion and skill 
formation counters the argument that highly regulated industrial relations systems deprive 
skills from their impact on occupational placement. The result that bargaining coordination 
does not moderate the credential effect may result from country differences in the signaling 
capacity of credentials that may represent skills more accurately in highly regulated systems 
than in some countries with less coordination. 
The human capital model is also more relevant in explaining labor market allocation in 
systems that spend a higher proportion of their wealth on education. This might result from 
higher levels of competitiveness and technological innovation, which increase labor markets’ 
demand for productive skills, in addition to high levels of formal schooling.  
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
To check the robustness of the presented results, several alternative model specifications have 
been applied to the data as well as to subsets of the sample. Because education system 
stratification (age of first selection) and vocational specificity are strongly negatively 
correlated (r=-0.60), the analyses were performed by including only one of the two variables 
at a time. The same was done for vocational specificity and coordination, because these two 
variables are positively related. At the country level, the following variables were included in 
the analysis to observe whether they would alter the results: average firm size (because of its 
potential relationship with skill formation processes and on-the-job training); and, the 
proportion of females in the workforce (to check for country variation in labor market 
composition according to gender). In a subsequent step, data for Canada, Estonia, and Finland 
was excluded, because occupational data is available only at the ISCO 1-digit level for these 
countries, to see if this had any impact on the results. Finally, the data was split into different 
age groups to test whether the influence of the country explanatory variables, which relate to 
recent years, changed across cohorts. The results are fairly robust to these alternative 
specifications.
13
  
5. Summary and discussion 
This study comparatively analyzed social inequality in educational attainment as well as 
education effects on occupational status attainment across 21 OECD countries. Considering 
two distinct aspects of educational outcomes—educational credentials and measured worker 
skills—the study attempted to assess their partial effects on occupational placement 
contingent on social origin in terms of parental education. Country variation in the individual-
level path dependencies was then explained by modelling cross-level interactions with the 
vocational specificity of the countries’ education system and level of economic coordination.  
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 The results of these models are available in an online supplement. 
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The main findings are as follows. Educational outcomes of prime-age workers in terms of 
both credentials and skills are strongly influenced by their parents’ educational level. 
Comparative results show that parental education effects on both educational outcomes are 
strongly and positively related across countries. As expected, small parental background 
effects on the educational achievement variables are observed in the Nordic countries Finland, 
Sweden, and Denmark, but also in Korea and the Netherlands. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
and Poland, cluster at the opposite end of the spectrum, along with the United States, 
Germany, and Italy, in experiencing large parental background effects. In contrast to parental 
effects on the two educational outcomes, which are positively correlated, there is a negative 
relationship between the effects of the two educational dimensions on occupational status 
attainment: in countries where credentialization tends to be high the human capital 
explanation of productive skills is less relevant, and vice versa. The liberal countries of the 
United Kingdom (England and Northern Ireland) and Canada cluster on the merit-based side, 
with relatively large effects of the skill variables and relatively small credential effects, while 
the Visegrád countries in the sample and Italy are on the other side, with strong credential 
effects and relatively weak skill effects. 
The main contribution of the study is the finding that country variations in the relationships 
observed are related to institutional variables. In countries with a high degree of economic 
coordination, the link between social origin and workers’ own educational outcomes in terms 
of certificates and measured skills is weaker than in less coordinated countries. At the same 
time occupation placement in these systems is based more on merit in terms of measured 
worker skills than on the credential attained, which contributes to socio-economic mobility. 
Consequently, coordinated market economies tend to mitigate educational inequality while 
increasing the effectiveness of worker skills for occupational placement, compared to 
economies with a lower degree of coordination. Therefore, the involvement of various actors 
at different levels in the way labor market supply and demand relationships are coordinated 
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seems to be not only beneficial for a relatively equitable distribution of high skill levels 
among the workforce, but also for workers to have their skills rewarded accordingly in the 
labor market.  
Countries with vocational-specific education systems show higher levels of inequality in skill 
attainment among their workforce. Regarding the ED linkage, vocational specificity is 
associated with higher education effects on status attainment in respect of both credentials and 
skills. As a result, a dominant system of combined school- and workplace-based training in 
initial education at the upper secondary level is associated with a greater tendency to social 
stratification. However, in systems in which vocational specificity is accompanied by a high 
degree of bargaining coordination, the detrimental effects level off. With respect to the 
moderating effect of countries’ educational institutions on occupational opportunities, the 
study adds to earlier research by analyzing both credentials and skills in an origin-education 
and education-destination framework. In line with previous findings, this study found that the 
effects of worker skills vary across countries according to differences in their education 
systems. However, the current study found stronger associations between worker skills and 
occupational placement in vocational-specific systems, in addition to the prevalence of 
credentialization in such systems, compared to general systems. The finding that labor market 
credentialization is particularly high in countries with a large combined school- and 
workplace-based education and training sector corroborates the prior research results.  
From a policy perspective, it might be of particular interest that both vocational specificity 
and bargaining coordination institutions are—independent and net of each other—positively 
related to the skill effects on occupational placement, while coordination tends to compensate 
for the unfortunate inequality impact of vocational specificity. Against the backdrop of the 
prominent role vocational education and training (VET) has for decades had on the European 
education reform agenda, what can be taken from these findings? With the aim of increasing 
labor market prospects and tackling youth unemployment, the idea of policy transfer for VET 
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and the dual apprenticeship system has been reinforced throughout the course of the financial 
and economic crisis, despite the fact that prior attempts have not been particularly successful. 
The results of this study support the view that replicating VET systems in other countries will 
be difficult because of its path-dependency on historically grown institutional structures. VET 
systems are embedded in formal and informal institutional structures that typically require the 
involvement of stakeholders, among them enterprises, schools, trade committees, social 
partners, teacher unions, public authorities, and advisory boards, at different levels. This study 
suggests that a relatively large vocational sector combined with a low level of coordination is 
associated with high inequalities in educational and social outcomes. In turn, labor markets in 
these systems are characterized by credentialization while workers’ numeracy and literacy 
skills are weakly related to their occupational placement. Comprehensive coordination seems 
to be important for VET to respond to labor market needs and ensure that the skills and 
competencies supplied are demanded and valued by employers. While the foundations of a 
good match between skill supply and demand may be laid in the demand-responsive initial 
VET, high levels of coordination seem to be particularly useful for maintaining and 
developing productive skills beyond schooling through on-the-job learning and ongoing 
training. Moreover, economic coordination may be seen as a precondition that the observed 
positive specialization effect of VET in terms of numeracy skills can translate into higher 
occupational outcomes.  
However, the comparative findings show that in all countries the education-job link is better 
explained by credential attained than by skills in numeracy and literacy. While the rather 
weak relationship between occupational status and generic skills is in line with prior research, 
it requires explanation; all the more so as the skill measures used reflect their current 
distribution among the workforce, whereas educational credentials pertain to formal schooling 
received in the past, in many cases decades ago. Of course, credentialization is present in any 
real-world economy but the numbers of regulated, i.e. credentialized, professions differ across 
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countries and sectors. In light of the heterogeneous skills among education attainment levels 
and jobs, however, the findings may point to a mismatch between skills supply and demand, 
and to the suggestion that learning outcomes beyond initial education are not adequately 
recognized in labor market allocation. The well-known objection, that the relevance of 
numeracy and literacy skills varies considerably across occupations, and the recognition that a 
credential may represent productive skills other than numeracy and literacy, does not render 
the comparative results non-significant as long as the skill demands of occupations are cross-
nationally comparable. After all, generic skills are highly correlated with more specific 
professional skills and as such they may be of at least some relevance in any vocational field.  
 
References 
Abrassart, A. (2013). Cognitive Skills Matter: The Employment Disadvantage of Low-
Educated Workers in Comparative Perspective. European Sociological Review, 29 (4), 707-
719.  
Allmendinger, J. (1989). Educational systems and labor market outcomes. European 
Sociological Review, 5(3), 231–250. 
Arrow, K. (1973). Higher education as a filter. Journal of Public Economics 2(3), 193–216. 
Barone, C., & Van de Werfhorst, H. G. (2011). Education, cognitive skills and earnings in 
comparative perspective. International Sociology, 26(4), 483-502. 
Bartlett, W. (2009). The Effectiveness of Vocational Education in Promoting Equity and 
Occupational Mobility Amongst Young People. Economic Annals, LIV(180), 7-39. 
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human Capital. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Bills, D. B. (2003). Credentials, Signals, and Screens: Explaining the Relationship Between 
Schooling and Job Assignment. Review of Educational Research, 73(4), 441-449. 
Blau, P. M., & Duncan, O. D. (1967). The American Occupational Structure. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Bol, T., & Van de Werfhorst, H. G. (2013). Edu cational Systems and the Trade-Off between 
Labor Market Allocation and Equality of Educational Opportunity. Comparative Education 
Review, 57(2), 285-308. 
Bol, T., & Weeden, K. A. (2015). Occupational closure and wage inequality in Germany and 
the United Kingdom. European Sociological Review 31(3), 354-369. 
33 
 
Breen, R. (2005). Explaining Cross-national Variation in Youth Unemployment. European 
Sociological Review, 21(2), 125-134. 
Breen, R., & Jonsson, J.O. (2005). Inequality of Opportunity in Comparative Perspective: 
Recent Research on Educational Attainment and Social Mobility. Annual Review of Sociology 
31, 223-243. 
Breen, R., Luijkx, R., Muller, W., & Pollak, R. (2009). Nonpersistent inequality in 
educational attainment: Evidence from eight European countries. American Journal of 
Sociology, 114(5), 1475-1521. 
Brown, T. A. (2006). Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research. New York: The 
Guilford Press. 
Brunello, G., & Checchi, D. (2007). Does school tracking affect equality of opportunity? New 
international evidence. Economic Policy, 52, 781–861. 
Busemeyer, M. R., & Iversen, T.. (2012). Collective Skill Systems, Wage Bargaining, and 
Labor Market Stratification. In M. Busemeyer, & C. Trampusch, The Political Economy of 
Collective Skill Formation (pp. 205-233). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Busemeyer, M. R., & Jensen, C. (2012). The impact of economic coordination and 
educational institutions on individual-level preferences for academic and vocational 
education. Socio-Economic Review, 10, 525-547. 
Cleasby, I. R., Nakagawa, S., & Schielzeth, H. (2015). Quantifying the predictability of 
behaviour: statistical approaches for the study of between-individual variation in the within-
individual variance. Methods in Ecology and Evolution, 6(1), 27-37. 
Collins, R. (1979). The credential society: An historical sociology of education and 
stratification. New York: Academic Press. 
Di Stasio, V., Bol, T., & Van de Werfhorst, H. G. (2016). What makes education positional? 
Institutions, overeducation and the competition for jobs. Research in Social Stratification and 
Mobility, 43, 53-63. 
Estevez-Abe, M., Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2001). Social Protection and the Formation of 
Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State. In P. Hall, & D. Soskice (Eds.), Varieties of 
Capitalism: The Challenges Facing Contemporary Political Economies (pp. 145-183). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ganzeboom, H. B.G., & Treiman, D. J. (2010). International Stratification and Mobility File: 
Conversion Tools. Retrieved from http://www.harryganzeboom.nl/ismf/index.htm 
Gelman, A. (2008). Scaling regression inputs by dividing by two standard deviations. 
Statistics in Medicine, 27, 2865–2873. 
GESIS (2014). Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), 
Germany – Reduzierte Version. GESIS Datenarchiv, Köln. ZA5845 Datenfile Version 1.0.0, 
doi: 10.4232/1.11865. 
Green, F., & McIntosh, S. (2007). Is there a genuine under-utilization of skills amongst the 
over-qualified? Applied Economics, 39(4), 427-439. 
34 
 
Hall, P. A., Gingerich, D. W. (2009). Varieties of capitalism and institutional 
complementarities in the political economy. British Journal of Political Science, 39(3), 449-
482. 
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hanushek, E. A., & Wößmann, L. (2006). Does educational tracking affect performance and 
inequality? Differences-indifferences evidence across countries. Economic Journal, 116, C63-
C76. 
Kerckhoff, A. C. (1995). Institutional Arrangements and Stratification Processes in Industrial 
Societies. Annual Review of Sociology, 21, 323-347. 
Kerckhoff, A. C., Raudenbush, S. W., & Glennie, E. (2001). Education, Cognitive Skill, and 
Labor Force Outcomes. Sociology of Education, 74, 1-24. 
Liu, Y., & Grusky, D.B. (2013). The Payoff to Skill in the Third Industrial Revolution. 
American Journal of Sociology, 118(5),1330-1374. 
Lumley, T. (2016). survey analysis of complex survey samples. R package version 3.31-5. 
Muthén, L.K., & Muthén, B.O. (2014). Mplus User’s Guide. (7th ed.). Los Angeles: Muthén 
& Muthén. 
OECD (2005). Education at a Glance. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2012). Lessons from PISA for Japan, Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in 
Education. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264118539-en 
OECD (2013a). Skills Outlook: first results from the OECD Survey of Adult skills. Paris: 
OECD Publishing. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264204256-en 
OECD (2013b). PISA 2012 Results: What Makes Schools Successful? Resources, Policies and 
Practices (Volume IV). Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264201156-en 
OECD (2013c). Technical Report of the Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC). Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
OECD (2013d). PISA 2012 Results: Excellence Through Equity. Giving Every Student the 
Chance to Succeed (Volume II). Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264201132-en 
OECD (2014). Lessons from PISA for Korea, Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in 
Education. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264190672-en 
OECD (2016a). Skills Matter: Further Results from the Survey of Adult Skills. OECD Skills 
Studies. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264258051-
en 
OECD (2016b). The Survey of Adult Skills: Reader’s Companion, Second Edition. OECD 
Skills Studies. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264258075-en 
35 
 
Pfeffer, F.T. (2008). Persistent Inequality in Educational Attainment and its Institutional 
Context. European Sociological Review, 24(5), 543-565. 
Reif, M., & Peterbauer, J. (2014). svyPVpack: A package for complex surveys including 
plausible values. R package version 0.1-1. https://github.com/manuelreif/svyPVpack. 
Rosenberg, S., Heimler, R., & Morote, E. (2012). Basic employability skills: A triangular 
design approach. Education + Training, 54(1), 7–20.  
Schneider, S.L. (2009). Confusing Credentials: The cross-nationally comparable 
measurement of educational attainment. DPhil thesis. Oxford: University of Oxford. 
Shavit, Y., & Blossfeld, H.-P. (Eds) (1993). Persistent Inequality. Changing Educational 
Attainment in Thirteen Countries. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Sewell, W., Haller, A., & Ohlendorf, G. (1970). The Educational and Early Occupational 
Status Attainment Process: Replication and Revision. American Sociological Review, 35(6), 
1014-1027. 
Sørensen, A. B. (1983). Processes of Allocation to Open and Closed Positions in Social 
Structure. Zeitschrift für Soziologie 12(3), 203-224. 
Spence, M.A. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, 355–74. 
Van de Werfhorst, H. G. (2011). Skill and Education Effects on Earnings in 18 Countries: The 
Role of National Educational Institutions. Social Science Research, 40, 1078–90. 
Visser, J. (2013). Data Base on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2011 (ICTWSS). Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies AIAS, University of Amsterdam. Retrieved from http://www.uva-
aias.net/uploaded_files/regular/ICTWSScodebook40.pdf 
Weber, M. (1980). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie. 
Besorgt von Johannes Winckelmann. Studienausgabe, Tübingen: Mohr. Retrieved from 
http://www.zeno.org/nid/20011439831 
Weeden, K. A., & Grusky, D. B. (2014). Inequality and market failure. American Behavioral 
Scientist, 58, 473–491. 
Winther, E., & Prenzel, M. (2014). Perspektiven der empirischen Berufsbildungsforschung. 
Kompetenz und Professionalisierung (Prospects of Empirical Research in VET. Skill and 
Professionalization). Sonderheft 22 der Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft, Wiesbaden, 
DE: Springer VS. 
Wolbers, M. H. J. 2003. Job Mismatches and their Labour-Market Effects among School-
Leavers in Europe. European Sociological Review, 19(3), 249-266. 
 
36 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Contextual moderation effects of country level variables (estimates from two-level random slopes models) 
  K1: HE cred. ON PE K2: Num. ON PE K3: Lit. ON PE 
Random slope ON 
   
Age of first selection   0.003   ( 0.056)   0.937   ( 0.705)   0.896   ( 0.706) 
Vocational specificity   0.010°  ( 0.006)   0.174*  ( 0.081)   0.162*  ( 0.082) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.168** ( 0.049)  -2.858***( 0.759)  -2.340** ( 0.797) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -0.110   ( 0.073)  -0.382   ( 1.409)   0.039   ( 1.637) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.147** ( 0.055)  -0.061   ( 1.095)  -0.650   ( 1.200) 
Intercepts    
Random slope   3.149***( 0.564)  27.773***( 7.392)  22.162** ( 7.817) 
Dependent variable   3.834***( 0.756) 274.968***(15.136) 283.310***(18.824) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   0.045*  ( 0.022)  11.405** ( 3.435)  12.565** ( 4.336) 
Dependent variable   0.079*  ( 0.033)  63.016***(16.222)  68.576***(15.825) 
Residual correlation  -0.011   ( 0.023) -18.189*  ( 8.249) -18.801** ( 6.139) 
  K4: ISEI ON HE cred. K5: ISEI ON Num. K6: ISEI ON Lit. 
Random slope ON 
   
Age of first selection   0.002   ( 0.406)  -0.023   ( 0.142)  -0.067   ( 0.134) 
Vocational specificity   0.113** ( 0.042)   0.033*  ( 0.015)   0.033*  ( 0.015) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.311   ( 0.485)   0.524***( 0.136)   0.527** ( 0.170) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -1.322   ( 0.877)   0.721*  ( 0.321)   0.860** ( 0.295) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.116   ( 0.731)  -0.712***( 0.147)  -0.699***( 0.153) 
Intercepts    
Random Slope  32.811***( 5.604)  -0.653   ( 1.289)  -1.135   ( 1.423) 
Dependent Variable  30.823***( 6.430)  32.904***( 4.412)  32.138***( 4.337) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   4.907*  ( 2.020)   0.379*  ( 0.172)   0.502** ( 0.188) 
Dependent variable   5.582** ( 1.910)   4.085*  ( 1.637)   4.105*  ( 1.654) 
Residual correlation  -2.376*  ( 1.123)   1.194*  ( 0.509)   1.136*  ( 0.543) 
Estimates are obtained using the Robust Maximum Likelihood estimator implemented Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2014). Skill proficiency is modelled as a latent variable using ten 
plausible values in numeracy and literacy, respectively (for details see Appendix B). Cred.: Credential, PE: parental education, Num.: Numeracy, Lit.: Literacy, ISEI: ISEI score of 
occupational status. 
Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria, Eurostat, OECD, Visser (2013); *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
°
 p<.1. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: S kills heterogeneity in 21 OECD countries: distribution of numeracy and literacy proficiency scores 
across educational attainment groups  
Literacy Numeracy
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Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria; The figure shows the mean value (black line), 
the interquartile range (blue area), and the range between the 5
th
 and the 95
th
 percentile of the educational skill 
distributions. Educational groups are classified according to the International Standard Classification of 
Education 1997 (ISCED 97). ISCED02: primary education and lower secondary education (ISCED 0/1/2/3C 
short); ISCED34V: upper secondary and post-secondary education (ISCED 3ABC long/4), vocational 
orientation; ISCED34G: general orientation; ISCED56: tertiary education (ISCED 5AB/6). 
Figure 2: Bivariate plots of country level estimates of parental effects on HE credential and numeracy attainment 
(left panel) and educational effects (HE credential and numeracy) on status attainment (right panel) 
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Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria; for estimates see Table A3 in Appendix A. 
Estimates are obtained from separate country models that take into account complex sampling structures and 
plausible values for numeracy. HE credential transmission: marginal predicted probability of attaining higher 
education (ISCED 56) for adults whose parents have attained higher education minus the probability for those 
whose parents have attained compulsory education only (ISCED 0-2). Numeracy skill transmission: coefficient 
of higher educated parents (vs. parents with compulsory education, y-standardized). ISEI ON HE credential: 
coefficient of higher education attainment (vs. compulsory education, y-standardized). ISEI ON Numeracy skill: 
coefficient of numeracy skill (standardized). All models control for age (ref.: 40 year olds), female (ref.: male), 
foreign born parents (ref: natives) and currently out of employment (ref.: employed).  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Sample statistics, country level data and country level estimates 
Table A1: Sample statistics of individual and country level data 
Variable min max mean SD miss n 
Age 30 49 39.62 5.7 0 33,460 
Female 0 1 0.45 0.5 0 33,460 
Foreign-born parents 0 1 0.11 0.31 178 33,460 
Currently jobless 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 33,460 
Low parents educ. (ISCED02) 0 1 0.33 0.47 1,781 33,460 
Medium parents educ. 
(ISCED34) 
0 1 0.43 0.49 1,781 33,460 
High parents educ. 
(ISCED56) 
0 1 0.24 0.43 1,781 33,460 
Low education (ISCED02) 0 1 0.12 0.33 0 33,460 
Medium education, 
vocational (ISCED34V) 
0 1 0.29 0.45 0 33,460 
Medium education, general 
(ISCED34G, incl. ISCED5B) 
0 1 0.35 0.48 0 33,460 
High education (ISCED5A6) 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 33,460 
pvnum1 38.84 450.09 277.21 49.5 0 33,460 
pvnum2 50.18 464.01 277.07 49.47 0 33,460 
pvnum3 27.75 462.2 277.07 49.46 0 33,460 
pvnum4 14.11 446.62 277.36 49.37 0 33,460 
pvnum5 29.93 450.41 277.40 49.45 0 33,460 
pvnum6 21.63 450.27 277.51 49.68 0 33,460 
pvnum7 36.83 446.95 277.30 49.47 0 33,460 
pvnum8 17.99 463.85 277.36 49.76 0 33,460 
pvnum9 20.96 450.79 277.35 49.49 0 33,460 
pvnum10 28.46 460.5 277.52 49.48 0 33,460 
pvlit1 30.76 432.56 279.11 44.80 0 33,460 
pvlit2 62.47 443.36 279.22 44.77 0 33,460 
pvlit3 16.23 431.3 279.31 44.71 0 33,460 
pvlit4 0 435.54 279.38 44.79 0 33,460 
pvlit5 9.63 433.05 279.19 44.60 0 33,460 
pvlit6 57.51 435.52 279.19 44.85 0 33,460 
pvlit7 2.77 427.97 279.17 44.72 0 33,460 
pvlit8 0 459.25 279.03 44.77 0 33,460 
pvlit9 43.28 436.39 279.13 44.79 0 33,460 
pvlit10 0 437.79 279.12 44.72 0 33,460 
Age of first selection 10 16 14.19 2.20 0 21 
Vocational specificity 0 45.92 12.39 15.63 0 21 
Bargaining coordination 1 5 2.98 1.34 0 21 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP) 4.37 7.94 6.06 0.97 0 21 
Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria, Eurostat, OECD, Visser (2013); pvnum/pvlit: 
plausible value in numeracy/literacy. 
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Table A2: Country level data 
Country 
Age of first 
selection 
Vocational 
specificity 
Bargaining 
Coordination 
Education 
expenditure 
(%GDP) 
AT 10 34.84 4.00 5.69 
BE 12 2.98 5.00 6.58 
CA 16 0.00 1.00 6.79 
CZ 11 32.46 2.00 4.99 
DE 10 43.43 3.60 5.13 
DK 16 45.92 3.90 7.94 
EE 15 0.33 1.60 5.53 
ES 16 1.84 3.50 5.49 
FI 16 12.61 4.80 6.47 
FR 15 12.19 2.00 6.13 
IE 15 2.71 4.00 6.15 
IT 14 0.00 3.30 4.60 
JP 15 0.00 4.10 5.14 
KR 14 0.00 3.25 7.64 
NL 12 19.88 3.60 6.22 
NO 16 15.40 4.10 7.42 
PL 16 6.43 1.00 5.46 
SE 16 0.00 4.00 6.33 
SK 11 29.08 1.80 4.37 
UK 16 0.00 1.00 6.39 
US 16 0.00 1.00 6.91 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, Visser (2013).
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Table A3: Country level estimates 
 
(1a) 
logit 
pared low 
(1b) 
logit 
pared high 
(1c) 
marg. prob. 
pared low 
(1d) 
marg. prob. 
pared high 
(1e) 
prob diff. 
(1d-1c) 
(1) 
HE cred. ON 
pared (1e/1d) 
(2) 
Numeracy ON 
pared 
(3) 
ISEI ON 
HE cred. 
(4) 
ISEI ON 
numeracy 
AT -2.68 (0.25) -1.11 (0.11) 0.06 0.25 0.18 0.74 0.28 (0.06) 0.64 (0.05) 0.26 (0.03) 
BE -2.66 (0.20) -0.27 (0.06) 0.07 0.43 0.37 0.85 0.31 (0.04) 0.56 (0.05) 0.21 (0.03) 
CA -2.49 (0.22) -0.65 (0.07) 0.08 0.34 0.27 0.78 0.29 (0.03) 0.42 (0.05) 0.21 (0.03) 
CZ -4.19 (0.80) -0.14 (0.93) 0.01 0.46 0.45 0.97 0.46 (0.09) 0.66 (0.09) 0.12 (0.04) 
DK -2.26 (0.20) -0.68 (0.06) 0.09 0.34 0.24 0.72 0.24 (0.04) 0.59 (0.05) 0.18 (0.03) 
EE -2.90 (0.22) -0.61 (0.07) 0.05 0.35 0.30 0.85 0.32 (0.04) 0.60 (0.04) 0.19 (0.03) 
FI -1.54 (0.12) -0.30 (0.04) 0.18 0.43 0.25 0.58 0.27 (0.05) 0.62 (0.05) 0.15 (0.03) 
FR -2.18 (0.14) 0.20 (0.04) 0.10 0.55 0.45 0.81 0.40 (0.03) 0.60 (0.06) 0.19 (0.02) 
DE -3.76 (0.58) -0.39 (0.49) 0.02 0.40 0.38 0.94 0.42 (0.06) 0.78 (0.06) 0.21 (0.03) 
IE -2.10 (0.13) -0.15 (0.04) 0.11 0.46 0.35 0.76 0.41 (0.04) 0.56 (0.04) 0.24 (0.03) 
IT -2.87 (0.17) 0.53 (0.07) 0.05 0.63 0.58 0.91 0.40 (0.07) 0.73 (0.04) 0.10 (0.02) 
JP -1.91 (0.20) 0.33 (0.07) 0.13 0.58 0.45 0.78 0.26 (0.05) 0.50 (0.05) 0.14 (0.03) 
KR -1.47 (0.10) 0.30 (0.03) 0.19 0.58 0.39 0.67 0.26 (0.04) 0.48 (0.05) 0.16 (0.02) 
NL -1.45 (0.13) 0.46 (0.04) 0.19 0.61 0.42 0.69 0.29 (0.04) 0.51 (0.05) 0.19 (0.03) 
NO -1.84 (0.20) -0.06 (0.06) 0.14 0.48 0.35 0.72 0.32 (0.05) 0.53 (0.04) 0.27 (0.03) 
PL -3.11 (0.35) 0.97 (0.20) 0.04 0.72 0.68 0.94 0.47 (0.06) 0.69 (0.06) 0.12 (0.03) 
SK -3.28 (0.32) 0.61 (0.18) 0.04 0.65 0.61 0.94 0.52 (0.06) 0.84 (0.05) 0.07 (0.03) 
ES -1.63 (0.11) 0.56 (0.03) 0.16 0.64 0.47 0.74 0.32 (0.04) 0.58 (0.04) 0.13 (0.03) 
SE -2.21 (0.18) -0.85 (0.05) 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.67 0.21 (0.04) 0.54 (0.05) 0.23 (0.03) 
UK -1.87 (0.19) 0.30 (0.06) 0.13 0.57 0.44 0.77 0.44 (0.05) 0.42 (0.05) 0.28 (0.04) 
US -3.01 (0.37) 0.18 (0.20) 0.05 0.54 0.50 0.91 0.56 (0.06) 0.57 (0.07) 0.20 (0.05) 
Mean   0.10 0.49 0.40 0.80 0.35 0.59 0.18 
Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria; pared: parental education low (ISCED 0-2), high (ISCED 56); estimates are obtained from separate country models 
that take into account complex sampling structures, using the R package “survey” (Lumley, 2016) and plausible values for numeracy using the R package “svyPVpack” (Reif & 
Peterbauer, 2014).. HE credential transmission: marginal predicted probability of attaining higher education (ISCED 56) for adults whose parents have attained higher education 
minus the probability for those whose parents have attained compulsory education only (ISCED 0-2). Numeracy skill transmission: coefficient of higher educated parents (vs. parents 
with compulsory education, y-standardized). ISEI ON HE credential: coefficient of higher education attainment (vs. compulsory education, y-standardized). ISEI ON Numeracy skill: 
coefficient of numeracy skill (standardized). All models control for age (ref.: 40 year olds), female (ref.: male), foreign born parents (ref: natives) and currently out of employment 
(ref.: employed). Standard errors in brackets. 
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Appendix B: Two-level CFA measurement model of numeracy proficiency 
Instead of observed proficiency scores, the PIAAC design of the cognitive assessment provides ten 
plausible values (PVs) which are imputed from a posteriori distribution that scales the cognitive 
test items using a latent regression item response model that is supplemented by socio-
demographic background information. To keep individuals response burden low and to 
achieve broad cognitive skills coverage at the same time, the full set of cognitive items is 
distributed across linked assessment booklets. Each survey respondent receives only one 
booklet, and the responses are then aggregated to maintain a wide range of content 
representation. This allows for an efficient estimation of reliable population characteristics. 
The PIAAC methodology accounts for uncertainty associated with the multiple imputed PVs 
(see more on the methodology in OECD, 2013c, Chapter 17: Scaling Cognitive Data). This 
implies that our estimation procedure must account for the imputation variance in addition to the 
sampling error component. To account for the uncertainty associated with this multiple imputation 
technique in the two-level analysis, individual skills are modelled as a latent construct using all ten 
PVs within a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) framework (Brown 2006). Since each one of the 
ten PVs is equally likely representing the unobserved true proficiency score, they are constrained to 
load equally on the latent factor, having the same error variances, as well as the same intercepts at the 
country level.  
Figure B1 is a graphical representation of the two-level CFA measurement model that mimics the 
latent regression model used in the PV methodology, including the estimated results for numeracy. 
Note that each of the ten plausible values of the numeracy score is constraint to load equally on the 
unobserved latent skills variable, have equal errors and intercepts. The model fit based on CFI/TLI, 
RMSEA and SRMR is excellent. The model is even acceptable according to the chi-square test, which 
is sensitive to large sample sizes, and thus it is safe to conclude that the differences between the 
estimated (co-)variance matrix and the empirical one are negligible. 
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Figure B.1: Measurement of the latent variable numeracy (two-level CFA model) 
 
Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria; *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
°
 p<.1. 
Factor loadings and residual variances are constraint to be equal on each level, as well as the intercepts of the 
indicator variables. 
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Supplement 
Table S1: Contextual moderation effects of country level variables (models omitting vocational specificity) 
  K1: HE cred. ON PE K2: Num. ON PE K3: Lit. ON PE 
Random slope ON 
   
Age of first selection  -0.047   ( 0.034)   0.027   ( 0.564)   0.083   ( 0.545) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.165***( 0.047)  -2.839***( 0.754)  -2.289** ( 0.786) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -0.074   ( 0.089)   0.359   ( 1.741)   0.644   ( 1.941) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.136*  ( 0.068)   0.264   ( 1.426)  -0.428   ( 1.489) 
Intercepts    
Random slope   3.744***( 0.557)  38.301***(10.092)  31.874** ( 9.867) 
Dependent variable   4.212***( 0.546) 283.225***(16.913) 275.755***(16.894) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   0.061***( 0.017)  16.030***( 4.115)  16.655** ( 5.557) 
Dependent variable   0.087** ( 0.033)  65.403***(16.497)  70.549***(15.911) 
Residual correlation  -0.022   ( 0.020) -14.941°  ( 8.650) -22.219***( 6.178) 
  K4: ISEI ON Cred. K5: ISEI ON Num. K6: ISEI ON Lit. 
Random slope ON 
   
Age of first selection  -0.571   ( 0.458)  -0.187   ( 0.116)  -0.232°  ( 0.123) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.270   ( 0.498)   0.480***( 0.130)   0.475** ( 0.156) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -0.861   ( 1.006)   0.822*  ( 0.373)   0.969** ( 0.334) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.111   ( 0.788)  -0.588** ( 0.186)  -0.576** ( 0.186) 
Intercepts    
Random Slope  37.444***( 7.209)   1.597   ( 1.656)   1.095   ( 1.935) 
Dependent Variable  31.914***( 5.963)  34.944***( 4.729)  34.096***( 4.203) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   6.685** ( 2.543)   0.525°  ( 0.272)   0.649*  ( 0.272) 
Dependent variable   5.609** ( 1.829)   4.202*  ( 1.881)   4.216*  ( 1.910) 
Residual correlation  -2.590   ( 1.629)   1.333°  ( 0.716)   1.261°  ( 0.732) 
Estimates are obtained using the Robust Maximum Likelihood estimator implemented Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2014). Skill proficiency is modelled as a latent variable using 
ten plausible values in numeracy and literacy, respectively (for details see Appendix B). Cred.: Credential, PE: parental education, Num.: Numeracy, Lit.: Literacy, ISEI: ISEI 
score of occupational status. 
Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria, Eurostat, OECD, Visser (2013); *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
°
 p<.1. 
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Table S2: Contextual moderation effects of country level variables (models omitting age of first selection) 
  K1: HE cred. ON PE K2: Num. ON PE K3: Lit. ON PE 
Random slope ON 
   
Vocational specificity   0.010** ( 0.003)   0.109*  ( 0.049)   0.099*  ( 0.048) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.169** ( 0.056)  -3.107***( 0.767)  -2.570** ( 0.796) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -0.102*  ( 0.045)   0.552   ( 1.103)   0.941   ( 1.330) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.147** ( 0.054)   0.185   ( 1.188)  -0.425   ( 1.311) 
Intercepts    
Random slope   3.138***( 0.341)  36.946***( 6.814)  30.836***( 8.351) 
Dependent variable   2.529***( 0.331) 273.010***(10.443) 282.978***(12.152) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   0.044*  ( 0.021)  12.506** ( 3.857)  13.496** ( 4.800) 
Dependent variable   0.104*  ( 0.044)  63.249***(16.296)  68.710***(15.806) 
Residual correlation  -0.010   ( 0.032) -18.005*  ( 8.337) -18.421** ( 5.975) 
  K4: ISEI ON Cred. K5: ISEI ON Num. K6: ISEI ON Lit. 
Random slope ON 
   
Vocational specificity   0.113** ( 0.040)   0.035***( 0.010)   0.038** ( 0.012) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.314   ( 0.467)   0.529***( 0.148)   0.553** ( 0.183) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -1.320   ( 0.813)   0.695** ( 0.203)   0.790***( 0.192) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.107   ( 0.666)  -0.709***( 0.156)  -0.715***( 0.174) 
Intercepts    
Random Slope  30.850***( 4.751)  -0.866   ( 1.506)  -1.808   ( 1.412) 
Dependent Variable  27.477***( 4.579)  29.179***( 5.158)  27.533***( 4.937) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   4.918*  ( 2.030)   0.390*  ( 0.165)   0.516** ( 0.169) 
Dependent variable   5.923** ( 1.953)   4.354***( 1.247)   4.490** ( 1.315) 
Residual correlation  -2.390°  ( 1.221)   1.224** ( 0.423)   1.199** ( 0.420) 
Estimates are obtained using the Robust Maximum Likelihood estimator implemented Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2014). Skill proficiency is modelled as a latent variable using 
ten plausible values in numeracy and literacy, respectively (for details see Appendix B). Cred.: Credential, PE: parental education, Num.: Numeracy, Lit.: Literacy, ISEI: ISEI 
score of occupational status. 
Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria, Eurostat, OECD, Visser (2013); *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
°
 p<.1. 
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Table S3: Contextual moderation effects of country level variables (models including a countries’ share of large firms) 
  K1: HE cred. ON PE K2: Num. ON PE K3: Lit. ON PE 
Random slope ON 
   
Vocational specificity   0.012** ( 0.004)   0.180** ( 0.056)   0.170** ( 0.057) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.133** ( 0.050)  -2.359***( 0.670)  -1.838*  ( 0.745) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -0.156** ( 0.052)  -1.566   ( 1.166)  -1.153   ( 1.368) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.207***( 0.053)  -1.039   ( 0.814)  -1.652°  ( 0.948) 
Share of large firms   0.140°  ( 0.077)   2.485** ( 0.722)   2.597** ( 0.858) 
Intercepts    
Random slope  -0.018   ( 0.022) 274.718***(14.503) 281.836***(18.266) 
Dependent variable   2.595***( 0.357) 274.718***(14.503) 281.836***(18.266) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   0.088°  ( 0.045)   0.193***( 0.053)   0.138** ( 0.046) 
Dependent variable   2.747** ( 0.903)   5.617*  ( 2.820)   6.596   ( 4.514) 
Residual correlation   0.014   ( 0.091)   0.033   ( 1.962)   0.608   ( 1.689) 
  K4: ISEI ON Cred. K5: ISEI ON Num. K6: ISEI ON Lit. 
Random slope ON 
   
Vocational specificity   0.113** ( 0.040)   0.033** ( 0.012)   0.033** ( 0.012) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.227   ( 0.518)   0.552***( 0.145)   0.583** ( 0.177) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -1.469   ( 0.949)   0.578   ( 0.357)   0.671*  ( 0.307) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.244   ( 0.688)  -0.680***( 0.156)  -0.690***( 0.156) 
Share of large firms   0.341   ( 0.535)   0.244   ( 0.269)   0.348   ( 0.233) 
Intercepts    
Random Slope  -2.581*  ( 1.053)  32.754***( 4.763)  31.836***( 4.613) 
Dependent Variable  30.684***( 7.396)   1.075** ( 0.385)   0.999*  ( 0.404) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   5.105** ( 1.695)   3.818** ( 1.317)   3.942** ( 1.399) 
Dependent variable  29.944***( 5.989)  -0.689   ( 1.395)  -1.310   ( 1.575) 
Residual correlation   0.828   ( 0.728)   0.599   ( 0.590)   0.473   ( 0.582) 
Estimates are obtained using the Robust Maximum Likelihood estimator implemented Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2014). Skill proficiency is modelled as a latent variable using 
ten plausible values in numeracy and literacy, respectively (for details see Appendix B). Cred.: Credential, PE: parental education, Num.: Numeracy, Lit.: Literacy, ISEI: ISEI 
score of occupational status. 
Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria, Eurostat, OECD, Visser (2013); *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
°
 p<.1. 
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Table S4: Contextual moderation effects of country level variables (models including a countries’ share of females among the workforce) 
  K1: HE cred. ON PE K2: Num. ON PE K3: Lit. ON PE 
Random slope ON 
   
Vocational specificity   0.010°  ( 0.006)   0.181*  ( 0.084)   0.133°  ( 0.075) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.177** ( 0.059)  -2.759** ( 0.870)  -2.746** ( 0.944) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -0.108   ( 0.075)  -0.516   ( 1.443)  -0.077   ( 1.506) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.153** ( 0.056)  -0.146   ( 1.102)  -0.692   ( 1.147) 
Share of females  -0.693   ( 1.881)   5.972   (28.682) -27.154   (28.278) 
Intercepts    
Random slope  -0.014   ( 0.025) 337.476***(35.909) 296.225***(46.379) 
Dependent variable   3.501** ( 1.278) 337.476***(35.909) 296.225***(46.379) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   0.086*  ( 0.039)   0.192***( 0.053)   0.139** ( 0.046) 
Dependent variable   0.798   ( 1.958)  11.294** ( 3.442)  12.073** ( 4.219) 
Residual correlation  -3.809   ( 2.424) -94.310°  (48.968) -19.477   (60.125) 
  K4: ISEI ON Cred. K5: ISEI ON Num. K6: ISEI ON Lit. 
Random slope ON 
   
Vocational specificity   0.085°  ( 0.044)   0.028*  ( 0.013)   0.025°  ( 0.015) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.723   ( 0.637)   0.434** ( 0.165)   0.388°  ( 0.231) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -1.338°  ( 0.736)   0.722*  ( 0.306)   0.857** ( 0.283) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.164   ( 0.733)  -0.695***( 0.151)  -0.648***( 0.176) 
Share of females -26.172   (21.575)  -5.038   ( 4.560)  -6.926   ( 6.954) 
Intercepts    
Random Slope  -2.732*  ( 1.103)  53.114***(12.780)  53.686***(12.062) 
Dependent Variable  43.376** (13.691)   1.049*  ( 0.468)   0.942°  ( 0.516) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   5.340** ( 1.745)   3.314*  ( 1.452)   3.279*  ( 1.413) 
Dependent variable  48.020** (14.660)   2.797   ( 3.610)   3.677   ( 5.557) 
Residual correlation -16.154   (18.676) -29.868*  (14.706) -31.21*  (13.814) 
Estimates are obtained using the Robust Maximum Likelihood estimator implemented Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2014). Skill proficiency is modelled as a latent variable using 
ten plausible values in numeracy and literacy, respectively (for details see Appendix B). Cred.: Credential, PE: parental education, Num.: Numeracy, Lit.: Literacy, ISEI: ISEI 
score of occupational status. 
Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria, Eurostat, OECD, Visser (2013); *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
°
 p<.1. 
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Table S5: Contextual moderation effects of country level variables (models omitting country data of CA. EE, FI) 
  K1: HE cred. ON PE K2: Num. ON PE K3: Lit. ON PE 
Random slope ON 
   
Vocational specificity   0.014** ( 0.005)   0.122°  ( 0.072)   0.125°  ( 0.074) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.152*  ( 0.069)  -3.899***( 0.727)  -3.220***( 0.800) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -0.090   ( 0.091)  -0.475   ( 1.547)  -0.195   ( 1.809) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.171** ( 0.065)   1.015   ( 1.145)   0.281   ( 1.243) 
Intercepts    
Random slope   2.169***( 0.374)  35.182***( 6.689)  28.729***( 7.002) 
Dependent variable   0.766***( 0.197) 279.207***(18.899) 301.548***(17.732) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   0.048   ( 0.032)  10.098*  ( 4.402)   9.984*  ( 4.360) 
Dependent variable   0.117** ( 0.042)  66.129***(17.322)  62.798** (18.204) 
Residual correlation  -0.054   ( 0.036) -18.512*  ( 7.756) -22.527***( 5.843) 
  K4: ISEI ON Cred. K5: ISEI ON Num. K6: ISEI ON Lit. 
Random slope ON 
   
Vocational specificity   0.099*  ( 0.046)   0.039*  ( 0.016)   0.039*  ( 0.016) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.650   ( 0.628)   0.616** ( 0.209)   0.680** ( 0.253) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -0.975   ( 1.039)   0.786*  ( 0.306)   0.851** ( 0.295) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.546   ( 0.986)  -0.867***( 0.152)  -0.869***( 0.179) 
Intercepts    
Random Slope  35.463***( 5.144)  -1.551   ( 1.206)  -2.068   ( 1.527) 
Dependent Variable  30.330***( 6.770)  31.075***( 5.329)  29.443***( 4.957) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   5.629** ( 1.842)   0.379°  ( 0.198)   0.565** ( 0.207) 
Dependent variable   5.012** ( 1.488)   4.588** ( 1.664)   4.544** ( 1.699) 
Residual correlation  -2.156°  ( 1.146)   1.317*  ( 0.605)   1.188*  ( 0.582) 
Estimates are obtained using the Robust Maximum Likelihood estimator implemented Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2014). Skill proficiency is modelled as a latent variable using 
ten plausible values in numeracy and literacy, respectively (for details see Appendix B). Cred.: Credential, PE: parental education, Num.: Numeracy, Lit.: Literacy, ISEI: ISEI 
score of occupational status. 
Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria, Eurostat, OECD, Visser (2013); *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
°
 p<.1. 
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Table S6: Contextual moderation effects of country level variables (30-39 year olds) 
  K1: HE cred. ON PE K2: Num. ON PE K3: Lit. ON PE 
Random slope ON 
   
Vocational specificity   0.009   ( 0.006)   0.221** ( 0.082)   0.221*  ( 0.090) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.168***( 0.046)  -2.987***( 0.793)  -2.770***( 0.757) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -0.109   ( 0.080)  -0.275   ( 1.332)   0.169   ( 1.683) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.116*  ( 0.051)  -0.136   ( 1.173)  -0.589   ( 1.271) 
Intercepts    
Random slope   2.894***( 0.620)  24.756** ( 7.453)  22.809*  ( 8.894) 
Dependent variable   4.505***( 0.836) 261.503***(13.969) 265.833***(18.492) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   0.009   ( 0.028)   4.458   ( 6.252)   8.306   ( 5.554) 
Dependent variable   0.076*  ( 0.033)  46.859***(13.197)  68.391***(14.509) 
Residual correlation  -0.009   ( 0.026) -13.336   ( 8.151) -21.189** ( 7.613) 
  K4: ISEI ON Cred. K5: ISEI ON Num. K6: ISEI ON Lit. 
Random slope ON 
   
Vocational specificity   0.133*  ( 0.058)   0.010   ( 0.012)   0.030** ( 0.009) 
Bargaining coordination  -0.355   ( 0.609)   0.341*  ( 0.148)   0.348*  ( 0.145) 
Expenditure on educ. (%GDP)  -1.021   ( 1.069)   1.034***( 0.292)   1.028***( 0.218) 
Mean IV: PE, HE, Num, Lit  -0.140   ( 0.916)  -0.983***( 0.196)  -0.929***( 0.177) 
Intercepts    
Random Slope  32.158***( 6.988)   0.134   ( 1.284)   0.030   ( 1.292) 
Dependent Variable  26.918** ( 8.419)  31.351***( 4.332)  34.609***( 4.402) 
Residual variance    
Random slope   6.636*  ( 3.238)   0.169   ( 0.183)   0.250   ( 0.228) 
Dependent variable   4.490** ( 1.520)   4.139** ( 1.450)   3.839** ( 1.461) 
Residual correlation  -2.841*  ( 1.368)   0.761** ( 0.270)   0.977** ( 0.299) 
Estimates are obtained using the Robust Maximum Likelihood estimator implemented Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2014). Skill proficiency is modelled as a latent variable using 
ten plausible values in numeracy and literacy, respectively (for details see Appendix B). Cred.: Credential, PE: parental education, Num.: Numeracy, Lit.: Literacy, ISEI: ISEI 
score of occupational status. 
Source: OECD PIAAC 2011/12, GESIS 2014, Statistik Austria, Eurostat, OECD, Visser (2013); *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, 
°
 p<.1. 
 
